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Abstract 
 
In recent years there has been a growing interest among mainstream Anglophone moral 
philosophers in the empirical study of human morality, including its evolution and 
historical development. This chapter compares these developments with an earlier point 
of contact between moral philosophy and the moral sciences in the early decades of the 
Twentieth century, as manifested in some of the less frequently discussed arguments of 
G. E. Moore and W. D. Ross. It is argued that a critical appreciation of Moore and Ross’s 
response to the emerging moral sciences of their day has significant implications for 
contemporary moral epistemology. The chapter also offers a novel interpretation of G. E. 
Moore’s ‘open question argument’. 
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‘An Assumption of Extreme Significance’: Moore, Ross and Spencer on Ethics and 
Evolution1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
After something of a ‘hiatus’, in recent years there has been a growing interest among 
mainstream Anglophone moral philosophers in the empirical study of human morality 
and its significance for moral philosophy. In this chapter I raise three questions. First, 
what happened in the early years of the Twentieth Century that made prominent members 
of mainstream Anglophone moral philosophers turn away from an interest in the ‘moral 
sciences’ (as they were then called), in the face of the rapid emergence of the empirical 
disciplines of psychology, sociology, anthropology and evolutionary biology? It may be 
tempting to think that the moral philosophers of the time simply ignored these 
developments in adjacent disciplines, but a closer reading some of the best known works 
of the period shows that they did not. On the contrary, they responded to these 
developments, and turned away from them on the basis of philosophical arguments. 
                                                
1 Parts of this material have been presented to the Amoral Sciences Club in Cambridge, 
the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, the Metaphysical Society in Trinity 
College Dublin, the Phileas Society in Geneva, and Birkbeck, University of London. I am 
grateful to the audience on those occasions for comments and questions, and to Katerina 
Deligiorgi for written comments on a previous draft intended for the 2013 Morality and 
Explanation conference at Nottingham. 
 
 3 
Second, why did the philosophers in question turn away from these developments? It may 
be tempting to think that the explanation is closely connected with the alleged diagnosis 
of the so-called ‘naturalistic fallacy’ in G. E. Moore’s seminal 1903 work Principia 
Ethica, but once more a closer reading of some of the best known works of the period 
shows that this hypothesis wrongly overplays the metaphysical aspect of the arguments in 
question at the expense of their epistemological aspect.2 Third, were the philosophers in 
question right to turn away from these developments in the way they did? It may be 
tempting to think that the philosophers in question turned away from these developments 
for reasons that more recent advances in philosophy and the moral sciences show to be 
either primitive or outdated, but I will suggest that their reasons for doing so display 
striking similarities with a common way of responding to analogous developments in 
contemporary moral philosophy. I will illustrate this point by briefly commenting on the 
ongoing debate about the normative significance of neuroscience (c.f. Berker 2009). In 
doing so, I will show that comparing the earlier point of contact between moral 
philosophy and the moral sciences with analogous points of contact in the present can 
serve to illuminate a number of issues in contemporary moral epistemology. 
 
2. Moore and Ross on evolutionary ethics  
 
I begin with the obvious, and therefore with the place of ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ in 
philosophical responses to developments in the moral sciences in the latter part of the 
                                                
2 Of course, the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of these arguments are closely 
connected, insofar as the identification of moral qualities as non-natural went hand in 
hand with the identification of basic moral knowledge as a priori. More of this below. 
See also Hurka 2014; Skorupski, MS. 
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Nineteenth Century and the early parts of the Twenieth. On one common way of reading 
the history of moral philosophy, the obvious way to explain the early and frequent 
dismissal of the moral sciences as irrelevant to ‘ethics proper’ is to see it as an 
implication of the alleged diagnosis of the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ by Moore in his Principia 
Ethica. On this reading, the normative insignificance of the moral sciences boils down to 
a basic truth of logic and/or metaphysics, namely the existence of an irreducible gap 
between evaluative/normative as opposed to descriptive/natural properties or predicates: 
what is good as opposed to what just is; or what ought to be as opposed to what is the 
case.3 It is one thing to say what our moral sensibility is actually like, or to describe and 
explain its development, function, and variable historical expressions. It is quite another 
thing to say what, if anything is good about it, or how it ought to be expressed. The 
enormous influence of this line of argument cannot be denied, and is clearly present at 
some level in both the authors I go on to discuss in this chapter. Yet even so, the idea that 
it is their diagnosis of the naturalistic fallacy that explains their reactions to the moral 
sciences of their time is a truth with important qualifications. As I will show in what 
follows, the naturalistic fallacy plays at best an auxiliary role both in Moore’s response to 
the moral sciences in the guise of the evolutionary ethics of Herbert Spencer, and in W. 
D. Ross’s later response to the moral sciences in the guise of evolutionary ethics and the 
                                                
3 As formulated by Moore, the naturalistic fallacy concerns the definition of good and has 
only indirect implications for claims about what is right, what ought to be, and therefore 
the so-called ‘is/ought’ gap targeted in what has come to be known as ‘Hume’s Law’. For  
more on this issue, see Moore 1993, 1912; Ross 1930. I say more about how to read 
Moore’s ‘open question argument’ in support of his non-naturalist position in the 
Appendix below. 
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French sociology.4 Moreover, this is the case even in passages of their work where Moore 
and Ross are explicitly concerned to dispute the attempt to draw substantially normative 
inferences on the basis of empirical claims about the nature of morality.5 
 
A clear case in point can be found near the start of W. D. Ross’s 1930 work The Right 
and the Good. As a prolegomenon to his account of our basic moral knowledge as 
consisting of a set of prima facie moral principles, Ross takes it upon himself to argue 
against the temptation to draw positive moral conclusions directly from empirical facts 
about the function of moral systems. His prime target in these passages is the emerging 
science of sociology, in the guise of the sociologists Emile Durkheim and Lucien Levy-
Bruhl, both of whom who Ross appears to have read (or have read about) in the original 
French.6 Ross writes: 
 
It would be foolish to deny the value of such a study, or the interest of many of the 
                                                
4 Of course, both Moore and Ross endorse a form of ethical non-naturalism that entails 
the rejection of any strict identification between normative and descriptive properties. My 
point is that it is not this metaphysical thesis that is the primary driver of their responses 
to work in the moral sciences, but rather a distinct, and logically independent 
epistemological claim.  
5 For one philosopher whose response to the emerging moral sciences did put the 
semantic/metaphysical features of moral thought at the forefront of discussion, see C. D. 
Broad’s review of Julian Huxley’s Evolutionary Ethics, published four decades after 
Moore’s Principia and in the decade following the appearance of Ross’s main ethical 
works (see e.g. Broad 1944, 366-7). In this review, Broad also explicitly connects the 
metaphysical and epistemological elements of the philosophical response I describe in 
this chapter (see e.g. Broad 1944, 361). 
6 The claim that the French sociologists were guilty of committing the naturalistic fallacy  
(or that they somehow assumed that you can infer an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’) is implausible 
(see e.g. Levy-Bruhl 1905, 93; Durkheim 1933, 32; Durkheim 1993, 30). For a more 
detailed discussion of Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl in this context, see Lillehammer 
forthcoming. 
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facts it has brought to light with regard to the historical origin of many such [moral] 
beliefs and practices… What must be denied is the capacity of any such inquiry to 
take the place of moral philosophy. (Ross 1930, 12) 
 
Some readers may see traces of ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ as a diagnostic tool in this 
passage. Yet when Ross proceeds to deny the normative significance of the empirical 
facts that sociology has brought to light, what he offers is not an argument against 
identifying moral properties with natural properties, or inferring an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’; 
but rather an argument aimed at a narrowly functional analysis of the correctness 
conditions of beliefs in general (whether moral or non-moral). He writes:  
 
… the analogy which it [sociology] draws between a moral code and a natural 
system like the human body… is an entirely fallacious one… [B]eliefs have the 
characteristic which bodies have not, of being true or false, of resting on knowledge 
or being the products of wishes, hopes and fears… (Ross 1930, 13) 
 
Ross’s point in this passage is that a purely functional analysis of the correctness 
conditions of moral (and other) beliefs fails to take account of the fact that beliefs have 
contents, the correctness conditions of which cannot be assumed without further 
argument to be a simple function of the social or psychological role that these beliefs 
contingently serve. Thus, it is not clear that at this point in Ross’s discussion of the 
normative significance of the moral sciences that ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ is playing any 
significant role at all. 
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More plausible traces of ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ as a philosophical diagnostic might be 
thought to be present in the following remarks from Ross’s Gifford lectures (published as 
The Foundations of Ethics nine years after The Right and the Good). The main target of 
Ross’s discussion of the moral sciences in this book is Herbert Spencer’s evolutionary 
ethics, In this later work, Ross writes: 
 
Now what we are considering at present is views as to the meaning of rightness, 
and it is surely obvious that the suggestion that ‘right’ means ‘comparatively 
evolved’ is not one that can be seriously entertained. (Ross 1939, 13)8 
 
So there is at least one type of naturalistic definition of at least one basic moral term that 
is definitely implausible. Still, it does not follow that no plausible naturalistic definition 
either of that, or of any other, basic moral term exists. Nor does this stronger claim play 
any explicit role in Ross’s argument, either at this, or at any other point in his response to 
Spencer.9 So even if Ross does implicitly rely on a diagnosis of the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ 
in his response to Spencer’s evolutionary ethics, that diagnosis is not at centre stage in 
                                                
8 Where Moore’s favoured ethical primitive is ‘good’, Ross favoured ethical primitive is 
‘right’, or ‘duty’.  
9 On the next page, Ross continues: ‘But even if we admit that the characteristics of being 
highly evolved, of tending to promote the maximum good, and of being right tend to a 
large extent to go together, we must surely recognize a closer relation between the first 
[i.e. being highly evolved] and the third [i.e. being right]. It will not be because of the 
merely historical fact that they come later in the course of evolution, but because they 
share in a characteristic common to the later stages of evolution, the characteristic of 
being promotive of wider good, that acts will tend to be right’ (Ross 1939, 14). The claim 
now is one about the explanatory relation between the good, the right, and being more 
evolved. It is the claim that if acts that come later in evolution tend to be right, then that is 
because such acts tend to be promotive of the wider good. It is not the claim that ‘the 
wider good’ cannot be defined in terms of some other property, natural or non-natural. 
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that response. 
 
Of course, Ross did not claim to have diagnosed ‘the naturalistic fallacy’, Moore did. So 
it is natural to think that it is to his work we should go in order to find this diagnosis 
being explicitly applied against any claim on behalf of the moral significance of the 
moral sciences. Yet what we find, both in Principia Ethica and in the later Ethics, is both 
quite different and independently instructive. Here are some of Moore’s remarks on 
Spencer’s evolutionary ethics: 
 
It might… be held that the direction in which living things have hitherto developed 
is, as a matter of fact, the direction of progress… It may be held that the more 
evolved, though not itself the better, is a criterion, because a concomitant, of the 
better… Finally… it may be held that, though Evolution gives us no help in 
discovering what results of our own efforts will be best it gives some help in 
discovering what it is possible to attain and what are the means of its attainment. 
(Moore 1903, 107) 
 
So far, Moore seems happy to play along. Yet he is not very impressed by the apparently 
alleged implications of these claims either for the nature of the good, or for what actually 
is good. He continues: 
 
In the mere fact, then, that these non-fallacious views of the relation of Evolution to 
Ethics would give so little importance to that relation, we have evidence that what 
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is typical in the coupling of the two names is the fallacious view to which I propose 
to restrict the name ‘Evolutionist Ethics’. This is the view that we ought to move in 
the direction of evolution simply because it is the direction of evolution. (Moore 
1903, 107-8) 
 
Note Moore’s use of the term ‘because’ in this passage. This is not plausibly read as 
stating any identity. So far, then, there is no mention of any ‘naturalistic fallacy’ being 
committed. True, ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ does appear in Moore’s diagnosis of what 
might have lead the evolutionary ethicist to make their claim about how moral claims are 
related to claims about evolution. Yet even here, Moore stops short of accusing Spencer 
of actually committing this fallacy. Instead, Moore suggests that Spencer is not really an 
‘evolutionary ethicist’ in any proper sense at all. This is what he says: 
 
It is plain, then, that Spencer identifies the gaining of ethical sanction with being 
more evolved: this follows strictly from his words. But Mr Spencer’s language is 
extremely loose, and we shall presently see that he seems to regard the view it here 
implies as false. We cannot, therefore, take it as Mr Spencer’s definite view that 
‘better’ means nothing but ‘more evolved’; or even that what is ‘more evolved’ is 
therefore ‘better’. But we are entitled to urge that he is influenced by these views, 
and therefore by the naturalistic fallacy. (Moore 1903, 100-101) 
 
The closest Moore gets to using his diagnosis of ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ against Spencer 
in this passage is to accuse him of being ‘influenced’ by it. This simple fact is itself 
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headline news in the present context, and a good reason to consider the possibility that 
there is something else, of equal philosophical importance, going on. By looking first (in 
this section) at how Ross makes use of Moore’s argument against Spencer in his own 
response to evolutionary ethics a few decades later, and second (in the next section) at 
Ross’s response to French sociology, I shall now argue that there is. 
 
There is noticeable overlap between Moore and Ross with respect to which aspects of 
Spencer’s work they address in their respective responses to his defense of evolutionary 
ethics. For example, at one point Moore directly quotes a number of passages from 
Spencer’s The Data of Ethics, where Spencer writes: 
 
Yes, there is one postulate in which pessimists and optimists agree. Both their 
arguments assume it to be self-evident that life is good or bad, according as it does, 
or does not, bring a surplus of agreeable feeling. (Spencer 1894, Sect. 10) 
 
And a bit later: 
 
No school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling 
called by whatever name – gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure, 
somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of 
the conception. (Spencer 1894, Sect. 16) 
 
Moore’s response is as follows: 
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Mr Spencer himself tells us his ‘proof’ is that ‘reversing the application of the 
words’ good and bad… ‘creates absurdities’ (Sect. 16)… So… he is… a naturalistic 
Hedonist. (Moore 1903, 104-105) 
 
Moore’s point here is twofold. First, Spencer is not, at bottom, an ‘evolutionary ethicist’ 
in Moore’s sense, as much as a (naturalistic) hedonist about the good, who thinks that 
evolution proceeds by producing more pleasure, and therefore more good on the whole. 
Second, the fundamental case for Spencer’s hedonism is not that it somehow accords 
with the direction of evolution, but rather that its denial ‘creates absurdities’. This is most 
plausibly read as an a priori claim about which ideas can be coherently affirmed together, 
and is therefore one that can be made from the comfort of the philosopher’s armchair.10   
 
The crucial premise in this argument is a commitment to a distinctive view about the 
foundations of moral knowledge.11 Moore formulates this view as follows: 
 
                                                
10 On exactly these grounds (i.e. the non-creation of absurdities), Moore rejects hedonism, 
not because he can prove its falsehoood (he doesn’t think there can be any proofs at this 
fundamental level), but because ‘it contradicts other propositions which appear to be 
equally true’ (Moore 1903, 145). Thus, if Spencer is ever guilty of committing ‘the 
naturalistic fallacy’, it is here: according to Moore he wrongly supposes that the question 
‘But is it good?’ is  ‘closed’ once it is agreed that the ‘it’ in question involves pleasure. 
11 According to Moore, moral ‘intuition’ can furnish a reason for holding a proposition to 
be true, at least when that proposition is self evident, i.e. when ‘there are no reasons 
which prove its truth’ (Moore 1903, 144). For critical discussion of Moore’s conception 
of self evidence, see Audi 1996. On Audi’s less restrictive (and in my view less 
implausible) definition, a self evident truth is a claim such that a) adequately 
understanding it entails being justified in believing it, and b) believing it on the basis of 
adequately understanding it entails knowing it. For further discussion of the notion of self 
evidence and how it relates to that with which we are acquainted, see the Appendix 
below. See also Skorupski MS. 
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We cannot tell what is possible, by way of proof, in favour of one judgement that 
‘This or that is good’… until we have recognised what the nature of such 
propositions must always be. In fact, it follows from the meaning of good… that 
such propositions are all of them… ‘synthetic’: they all must rest in the end on 
some proposition which must be simply accepted or rejected, which cannot be 
logically deduced from any other proposition. This result... may otherwise be 
expressed by saying that the fundamental principles of Ethics must be self 
evident… The expression ‘self evident’ means properly that the proposition so 
called is evident or true, by itself alone; that it is not an inference from some 
proposition other than itself. (Moore 1903, 143)12 
 
Ross’s later discussion in The Foundations of Ethics makes exactly the same move as 
Moore’s in this respect. Ross claims that Spencer’s ‘fundamental ethical theory’ is that ‘it 
is conduciveness to pleasure that is… the real ground of rightness’; that he believes that 
‘life always contains a surplus of pleasure over pain; and that conduciveness to life and 
conduciveness to pleasure always go together’; that therefore ‘[h]is fundamental theory 
turns out to be universalistic Hedonism, or Utilitarianism’; and that consequently 
evolutionary ethics ‘need not be examined as a separate form of theory regarding the 
ground of rightness’ (Ross 1939, 59). Once more, then, Spencer is at bottom really a 
                                                
12 The intimate connection between Moore’s non-naturalism and his aprioristic moral 
epistemology might be thought to be evident in at least one of the sentences in this 
passage (i.e. the one that refers back to his argument about the meaning of ‘good’). The 
fact that these two views are intimately connected does not undermine the claim that they 
are logically independent. 
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hedonist, and is not (in Moore’s terms) a genuine evolutionary ethicist at all.13 
 
Although he follows Moore very closely, Ross begins his quotations from Spencer a bit 
earlier than Moore. The first passage quoted by Ross from Spencer is this: 
 
Is there any postulate involved in these judgements of our conduct? Is there any 
assumption made in calling good the acts conducive to life, in self or others, and 
bad those which directly or indirectly tend towards death, special or general? Yes; 
an assumption of extreme significance has been made – an assumption underlying 
all moral estimates… (Spencer 1894; quoted in Ross 1939, 26-7)  
 
The assumption in question (and the assumption mentioned in the title of this chapter) is 
that something (namely pleasure) is inevitably connected with things that are ‘conducive 
to life’, and that this thing (i.e. pleasure) is what good is. This is the claim that allegedly 
stands as the foundation of our moral knowledge. It is a claim the truth or falsity of 
which, according to Ross, is assumed on both sides of the debate to be self evident a 
priori. No development in the moral sciences therefore has the potential to change our 
fundamental entitlement to this claim one way or another. With respect to this 
fundamental truth of morality, the moral science, be it evolutionary or sociological, is 
‘simply beside the mark’ (Ross 1930, 15).  
                                                
13 Moore’s contemporary, and fellow intuitionist, Hastings Rashdall takes a similar swipe 
at Spencer in his 1907 work The Theory of Good and Evil, where he claims that ‘Morality 
essentially consists in the promotion of a good or ideal of life, the nature of which is 
discerned by our rational judgements of value’, at least some of which are self evident a 
priori. (Rashdall 1907, 401. See also Marett 1902, 246).  
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3. Ross on debunking explanations 
 
This epistemological reading of the Moore and Ross’s response to the moral sciences of 
their time is reinforced by Ross’ discussion, in The Right and the Good, of what is 
nowadays called a ‘debunking argument’ against our possession of moral knowledge. 
This discussion includes the following oft-cited passage, with which many contemporary 
moral philosophers will be familiar. Ross says: 
 
… the nature of the self-evident is not to be evident to every mind however 
undeveloped, but to be apprehended directly by minds that have reached a certain 
level of maturity… (Ross, 1930, 12) 
 
This quotation has sometimes been used to illustrate the fact that self evident truths need 
not be obvious, or be immediately apprehended as such (c.f. Audi 1996). Yet in the 
context of the discussion in The Right and the Good, Ross’s aim can be shown to be 
much more ambitious. Here is the quotation again, accompanied by its surrounding 
argument: 
 
… if human consciousness is continuous, by descent, with a lower consciousness 
which had no notion of right at all, that need not make us doubt that the notion is an 
ultimate and irreducible one, or that the rightness (prima facie) of certain types of 
act is self-evident; for the nature of the self-evident is not to be evident to every 
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mind however undeveloped, but to be apprehended directly by minds that have 
reached a certain level of maturity [my italics], and for minds to reach the 
necessary degree of maturity the development that takes place from generation to 
generation is as much needed as that which takes place from infancy to adult life. 
(Ross, 1930, 12) 
 
So why does Ross, the moral philosopher, think it is necessary to consider the possibility 
that ‘human consciousness is continuous, by descent, with a lower consciousness which 
had no notion of right at all’? What concerns him in this passage, close to the beginning 
of his best known ethical work, is that all our claims to moral knowledge are based on 
contingent and shaky foundations. He is concerned to rebut the challenge that knowledge 
of the causes and functions of our moral beliefs will effectively debunk those beliefs, in 
virtue of the contents of those beliefs being at best accidentally related to their 
justificatory, or veridical, grounds.   
 
Like many of his philosophical predecessors who were also concerned about the ‘origin’ 
of our moral faculty, Ross is very clear that he accepts the potential both for debunking, 
and for vindicating, explanations of moral beliefs, whether in moral or non-moral terms. 
He writes:  
 
An inquiry into the origin of a judgement may have the effect of establishing its 
validity… [I]f we find that the pre-existing judgements were really an instance of 
knowing, and that the inferring was also really knowing… our inquiry into the 
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origin of the judgement will have established its validity. (Ross 1930, 14) 
 
One potential case is human knowledge with a divine source (c.f. Lillehammer 2010). 
Another is justified reliance on testimony with a human source. A third (and possibly the 
one that Ross has in mind) is inferential knowledge based on previously grasped self-
evident truths. Yet Ross’ immediate concern in this passage are the prospects for a 
debunking explanation of our moral beliefs based on specific empirical claims made by 
the moral sciences of his day (c.f. Levy-Bruhl 1905, 70; 166; Durkheim 1993, 33) The 
general phenomenon is one that will be familiar to contemporary readers as an epistemic 
defeater in the form of ‘tracking failure’, or responsiveness to (ethically or 
epistemologically) ‘irrelevant factors’ (cf. Lillehammer 2010; Berker 2009). Ross writes: 
 
… if anyone can show that A holds actions of type B to be wrong simply because 
(for instance) he knows such actions to be forbidden by the society he lives in, he 
shows that A has no real reason for believing that such actions have the specific 
quality of wrongness, since between being forbidden by the community and being 
wrong there is no necessary connexion… He does not, indeed, show the belief to be 
untrue, but he shows that A has no sufficient reason for holding it true; and in this 
sense he undermines its validity. (Ross 1930, 14)18 
                                                
18 In his discussion of Spencer’s view in The Foundations of Ethics, Ross also considers a 
metaphysical debunking argument against the very existence of moral obligation, along 
the following lines: ‘May the upshot of the evolutionary account be… that there is no 
such thing as obligatoriness; that there is nothing in reality answering to the meaning 
which we have in mind when we use the word obligatory, the only distinction that 
remains being that between less and more evolved acts?’ (Ross 1939, 15). Ross’s claim 
 17 
 
In other words, regardless of the truth-value of a given moral belief, our warrant for that 
belief can be undermined by showing that our possession of that belief has the wrong 
kind of relation to what makes it either true, or justified.19 
 
Ross denies that this possibility suffices to undermine our claim to have at least some 
moral knowledge. His position, in a nutshell, is this: basic moral knowledge (in the form 
of prima facie principles) is a priori accessible as self-evident to minds at a certain stage 
of development, and therefore available regardless of any a posteriori knowledge those 
minds may or may not have of their own developmental history, the social function of 
their moral sensibility, or other facts about the causes of their moral beliefs. Furthermore, 
the human mind has reached a stage of development at which basic moral knowledge is, 
in fact, a priori accessible as self-evident. In fact, we actually demonstrate that we have 
access to such knowledge whenever we exercise the relevant capacity (e.g. when we 
correctly rule out certain moral claims as absurd or implausible). Ross writes: 
 
… the human mind… is competent to see that the moral code of one race and age is 
in certain respects inferior to that of another. It has, in fact, an a priori insight into 
certain broad principles of morality, as it can distinguish between a more or less 
                                                                                                                                            
that we have a priori access to basic moral knowledge in the form of self evident moral 
principles provides him with a response to this form of debunking argument also. 
19 It might plausibly be objected that Ross is overstating the case when he says that 
justification requires there to be a ‘necessary’, as opposed to a ‘reliable’ connection 
between the causal and justificatory grounds of beliefs. It might also be questioned 
whether reliable tracking is everywhere a necessary condition for knowledge or justified 
belief). I pass over these complications in what follows. For discussion, see e.g. Enoch 
2012). 
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adequate recognition of these principles… [T]here is a system of moral truth, as 
objective as all truth must be, …and from the point of view of this, the genuine 
ethical problem, the sociological inquiry is simply beside the mark. (Ross 1930, 14-
15)20 
 
So what ultimately protects our basic moral beliefs from potential debunking is that at 
least some of our moral beliefs are responsive to self-evident principles that we know a 
priori. Not only do we not need the a posteriori discoveries of moral sciences like 
sociology to access these truths, no such discoveries are able to undermine our actual 
entitlement to them.21 
 
It is worth briefly stating how modest Ross’s claim actually is before concluding the 
historical part of this chapter. First, and as Ross would be the first to admit, from the fact 
that some of our basic moral beliefs are immune to debunking explanations, it does not 
follow that all, most, or even many of them are. For example, Ross makes no analogous 
claim on behalf of moral beliefs inferred from basic principles via a posteriori linking 
                                                
20 At this point, Ross and the French sociologists definitely part company (See e.g. Levy-
Bruhl 1905, 122; 204; Durkheim 1993, 130). 
21 In his 1907 discussion of Spencer, Rashdall considers and rejects a potential debunking 
argument for moral and other beliefs, claiming that ‘Spencer’s theory involves us in a 
hopeless scepticism, as does every theory which attempts to account by experience for 
the principles of thought, which are implied in every step of the process by which 
experience is turned into knowledge’ (Rashdall 1907, 371). Rashdall’s response is based 
on an analogy between moral norms and other ‘laws of thought’, such as the law of 
contradiction; an argument he attributes to Cook Wilson. He writes that ‘ If these laws are 
really no necessities of thought but mere inherited results of accidental experiences, it is 
possible that they are untrustworthy’ (Rashdall 1907, 370). Discussion of this argument 
and the various comparisons on which it depends would take me to far afield here (c.f. 
Ross 1939, 15-19).  
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premises. Nor (as we have seen) does he claim that all thinking creatures have infallible 
insight into which moral principles are, in fact, self-evident. In both cases, someone’s 
firm conviction about the privileged status of one moral belief or another could in 
principle be the target of a successful debunking argument. Second, Ross is obviously 
aware of the epistemological challenge that has traditionally been thought to arise from 
the fact that there is widespread disagreement on moral questions both ‘in different 
societies’ and ‘within the same society’; including ‘a real difference of opinion as to the 
comparative worth of different goods’ (Ross 1939, 17; 19). In response, Ross claims that 
‘on examination’ such disagreement (at least among ‘sufficiently mature’ minds) can be 
shown to depend ‘not on disagreement about fundamental moral principles, but partly on 
differences in the circumstances of different societies, and partly on different views 
which people hold, not on moral questions but on questions of fact’ (Ross 1939, 18). The 
fact of widespread moral disagreement, Ross thinks, ‘should weaken perhaps our 
confidence in our own opinions, but not weaken our confidence that there is some 
opinion that would be true’ (Ross 1939, 19).  
 
4. Back to the present 
 
So what (if anything) has this got to do with us? Ross’s response to debunking 
explanations of moral beliefs is a response to an argument of the following form: 
 
The psychological states that give rise to moral response M respond to 
environmental factors of type N; there is no reliable connection between 
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environmental factors of type N and the appropriateness conditions of M; So, the 
psychological states that give rise to moral response M respond to environmental 
factors that are not reliably connected with the appropriateness conditions for M; 
So, moral response M fails to have any genuine normative force.23 
 
This is an argument that will be familiar from discussions of debunking explanations of 
moral beliefs and other ethically significant attitudes in contemporary moral philosophy 
(c.f. Joyce 2005; Singer 2005; Street 2006; Berker 2009). The response given by Ross to 
instances of this argument form arising from the moral sciences of his time is of basically 
the same kind as the response given by a number of contemporary philosophers to 
instances of this argument form arising from the moral sciences of our own time. One 
example will suffice to make the point. In his 2009 paper ‘The Normative Insignificance 
of Neuroscience’, Selim Berker aims to defuse a number of debunking arguments 
targeted at a limited range of commonsense moral intuitions (more specifically: 
deontological commonsense moral intuitions), and put forward in recent work by Joshua 
Greene, Peter Singer and others (e.g. Singer 2005; Greene 2007). The gist of these 
arguments is that if we reflect rationally on the causes of our moral intuitions we will be 
forced to abandon a significant range of moral beliefs at the heart of common sense 
morality (more specifically: a range of beliefs traditionally associated with deontological, 
as opposed to consequentialist moral theories).24 One of the less implausible debunking 
                                                
23 The term ‘appropriateness condition’ as used here is meant to be neutral between 
questions of truth and questions of justification. Nothing substantial in what follows 
hinges on this piece of terminological convenience. 
24 The scope of the debunking argument considered by Ross is the set of our moral beliefs 
as a whole. The scope of the debunking argument considered by Berker is some subset of 
our moral beliefs, or moral intuitions, of a broadly deontological nature. The two 
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arguments considered, and rejected, by Berker is an instance of the argument form stated 
in the paragraph above. The particular instance of this argument form considered and 
rejected by Berker proceeds as follows:  
 
The emotional processing that gives rise to deontological intuitions responds to 
factors that make a dilemma personal rather than impersonal; the factors that make 
a dilemma personal rather than impersonal are morally irrelevant; So, the 
emotional processing that gives rise to deontological intuitions responds to factors 
that are morally irrelevant; So, deontological intuitions, unlike consequentialist 
intuitions, do not have any genuine normative force. (Berker 2009, 321) 
 
Berker calls this argument ‘the argument from morally irrelevant factors’. The key 
premise of the argument, he argues, is the second (in italics above). About this premise, 
he makes the following comment: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
arguments are nevertheless importantly connected, for at least three reasons. First, if 
Ross’s response to the arguments he considers is successful, then this may provide a 
vindication of some of the deontological intuitions targeted in the argument considered 
by Berker. (Ross argues that some deontological prima facie principles are a priori self 
evident.) Second, if there is no response to the arguments considered by Ross, then it is 
up for grabs whether any of the intuitions considered by Berker and Greene are safe from 
debunking (this is one way of reading Singer’s challenge in Singer 2005 and de Lazari-
Radek and Singer 2012). Third, on at least one way of reading the argument considered 
by Berker, the reason why consequentialist intuitions are safe from debunking is that they 
can be vindicated on Rossian terms (this is arguably the most plausible way of reading 
Singer’s response to his own challenge in the above cited works). Another way in which 
the arguments considered by Ross and Berker differ is with respect to the centrality of 
moral principles in the beliefs or intuitions that are said to be evaluable from the 
armchair. Ross thinks it is (prima facie) moral principles that are a priori self evident. 
Berker makes no such claim. 
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The first thing to note is that… [this] premise… appeals to a substantive normative 
intuition, which presumably one must arrive at from the armchair, rather than 
directly read off from any experimental results; this is why the argument does not 
derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. I believe that this feature is a virtue of the argument; 
however, it is also its ultimate undoing. (Berker 2009, 322)25 
 
It is its ultimate undoing because, according to Berker, ‘the appeal to neuroscience is a 
red herring’. All the real work in the argument is done by the ‘identification, from the 
armchair’, first of ‘the distinction between dilemmas-eliciting-deontological-reactions 
and dilemmas-eliciting-consequentialist-reactions with the distinction between personal 
and impersonal moral dilemmas’, and second, of ‘a substantial intuition about what sorts 
of factors out there in the world are and are not morally relevant’; the mere distinction 
between something being ‘personal’ or ‘impersonal’ in the relevant sense not being one 
of them (Berker 2009, 326).  The ‘basic problem’ with this argument, according to 
Berker, is that ‘once we rest our normative weight on an evaluation of the moral salience 
of the factors to which our deontological and consequentialist judgements are responding, 
we end up factoring out… any contribution that the psychological processes underlying 
those judgements might make to our evaluation of the judgements in question.’ (Berker 
2009, 326). To put the point in Ross’s words, from the point of view of the substantially 
moral question, the neuroscientific inquiry is ‘simply beside the mark’ (c.f. Ross 1930, 
15). 
                                                
25 As is clear from this passage, Berker would appear to inherit from his intuitionist 
ancestors not only the basic structure of their response to the debunking challenge, but 
also their close association between what is accessible from the armchair (or a priori) and 
what is irreducibly normative, and therefore allegedly non-natural. 
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In sum, both Ross and Berker maintain that the crucial premise in the debunking 
arguments they respectively consider is the second (in italics above). Both Ross and 
Berker claim that the defence of this premise relies on normative intuitions that are 
available from the armchair. Both Ross and Berker therefore claim that the empirical 
evidence cited in the debunking argument is a red herring: all the real argumentative 
work is done by means of ‘armchair theorizing’ (in Ross’s case, a priori) about whether 
the features of the world to which our moral sensibility is responding are, or are not, 
morally ‘relevant’. It follows that the response to the moral sciences given by armchair 
moral philosophers like Berker and others at the start of the Twenty-first Century is for 
practical purposes the same that that given by the classical intuitionists at the start of the 
Twentieth Century. So what (if anything) has changed? 
 
5. Armchair or garden chair? 
 
To begin answering this question, it is necessary to ask if there is any plausible 
combination of metaphysical and epistemological claims that could secure the ‘armchair’ 
response to the debunking challenge, short of a version of classical intuitionism that 
grounds our moral knowledge in our access to a priori self evident truths or principles. 
The range of options is arguably quite restricted. For example, any option that falls short 
of entailing that our entitlement to moral claims the truth of which is accessible from the 
armchair is asymmetrically privileged with respect to our entitlement to moral claims the 
truth of which is not thus accessible will be consistent with the possibility that reflection 
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on facts not accessible from the armchair (such as the actual causes of moral intuitions or 
beliefs) has the power to debunk at least some of the moral claims the truth of which is in 
principle accessible from the armchair (including, potentially, some deontological 
intuitions). To claim that such empirically informed reflection would not, in fact, 
undermine some particular intuition or belief is to take an inductive (if normatively 
laden) bet on the rational outcome of such a process, the a posteriori inputs to which 
cannot, by hypothesis, be assumed to be ‘simply off the mark’. In saying this, I do not 
want to suggest that a classical intuitionist conception of moral knowledge as based on 
our a priori grasp of self-evident truths or principles is the only option available to those 
who would hope to dismiss the normative significance of neuroscience, sociology, 
evolutionary psychology, or any other part of the moral sciences. I do, however, suspect 
that some very influential parts of the history of Twentieth Century moral philosophy can 
be shown to manifest a notable tendency in exactly that direction (See e.g. Audi 1996). 
But so what? Why should contemporary armchair philosophers worry about taking on the 
commitments of classical intuitionism? 
 
My guess is that many contemporary philosophers who are impressed by recent progress 
in the human sciences would want to avoid a commitment to the strongly foundationalist 
intuitionism espoused by Ross and Moore. After all, there are well known objections to 
historical attempts to secure our claim to moral knowledge by grounding it in our grasp 
of a priori self evident truths or principles. One of these objections (and one of which the 
classical intuitionists were obviously aware) is that even if there are some a priori self 
evident moral truths (e.g. ‘You should promote the good, whether in yourself or others’), 
 25 
these truths could be no more than vacuous ‘sham axioms’, in Sidgwick’s phrase (c.f. 
Levy-Bruhl 1905, 173; Ross 1939; Lillehammer 2010). A second (and related) objection 
is that all substantive moral truths (e.g. ‘justice is fairness’) are the results of contingent 
social construction, and so at best instances of what has come to be known as a 
‘historical’ a priori, i.e. claims a commitment to which may constitutive of some 
historically actual, but not every possible, moral epoch or sensibility (c.f. Levi-Bruhl 
1905; Hacking 2002). I do not propose to pursue these objections further here. Instead, I 
shall consider what, if anything, might lead the contemporary armchair philosopher to 
stop short of a commitment to the ‘holy grail’ of a priori self evidence, while 
nevertheless holding out for an ‘armchair’ response to potential debunking explanations 
motivated by claims made by the moral sciences, such as sociology, psychology or 
evolutionary biology. 
 
I can think of at least three problems that might have worried someone like Ross in face 
of the rejection of his claim that moral knowledge can be grounded in a priori self 
evidenct principles. In each case, I think many contemporary philosophers would respond 
that there is less room for concern than Ross may have thought, and therefore more 
reason to formulate the response to traditional debunking challenges in less 
epistemologically demanding terms. 
 
First, it might have been worried that in the absence of a foundation in a priori self-
evidence, our claims to moral knowledge would extend only to contingent truths, thereby 
undermining the widely accepted belief that some moral claims are necessary. On this 
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point, the intervening period between the time of the classical intuitionists and the present 
time has made a substantial difference to how the claim that moral truths have one modal 
status rather than another is likely to be understood. No serious philosopher after Putnam 
and Kripke is going to assume without argument that all necessary truths are knowable a 
priori. If it were actually true that goodness is pleasure, then it could be necessarily true 
that goodness is pleasure, provided that terms like ‘goodness’ and ‘pleasure’ are 
interpreted as rigid designators, and therefore refer to the same property in all possible 
worlds (cf. Kripke 1980). The fact that pleasure is what ‘good’ rigidly designates could 
be something we are only able to settle a posteriori, for example on the basis of an 
evolutionary or neuroscientifically informed moral science.27 
 
Second, it might have been worried that in the absence of a grounding in a priori self 
evidence, there is no way to account for how we can have knowledge of anything 
genuinely normative.28 This worry embodies an assumption that many contemporary 
philosophers would reject, namely that all basic normative truths (or truths about 
‘reasons’) are a priori. Yet even if we accept this controversial claim, we do not thereby 
have to accept that all basic normative truths are self evident. We would only be forced to 
this conclusion if there were no other way to show that our basic moral knowledge is a 
priori (such as an a priori grounding of moral knowledge in a privileged set of 
explanatorily coherent principles). It is not at all obvious that we must accept this 
                                                
27 The claim that ‘good’ functions as a rigid designator in the relevant sense could still, of 
course, be something that we are able to discover from the ‘armchair’ (c.f. Jackson 1998). 
Yet this issue is equally controversial. 
28 The claim that all normative knowledge is basically a priori is at least comparatively 
less controversial than the claim that all a priori knowledge is basically normative. For a 
defence of the latter claim, see Skorupski 2011. 
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assumption. If we do not, then we have no overwhelming reason to accept the claim that 
our basic moral knowledge requires a priori self evidence in the sense defended by the 
classical intuitionists. 
 
Third, it might have been worried that in the absence of a foundation in a priori self-
evidence, our moral beliefs would be unjustified. This concern arguably embodies at least 
one of two assumptions that many contemporary philosophers would reject. The first is 
the ‘aprioristic’ assumption that no self-evident moral truths are a posteriori. This is a 
controversial assumption that even some intuitionists would deny (consider some of the 
obviously unacceptable things that actual people have found it possible to do to each 
other during the course of human history. The list is virtually endless.). The second is the 
‘foundationalist’ assumption that the only way for our moral beliefs to be justified is for 
them to be derivable (either directly or indirectly) from a set of basic moral principles, or 
axioms, on which they asymmetrically depend. This is also a controversial assumption 
that even some intuitionists would deny (e.g. because they would claim that the set of 
basic moral truths is not capable of any interesting and psychologically realistic 
axiomatization). The denial of either of these assumptions does, however, come at a cost. 
The cost of giving up the first assumption is that a certain amount of pressure is put on 
the idea that all basic moral knowledge is accessible from the armchair. The cost of 
giving up the second assumption is that a certain amount of pressure is put on the idea 
that we are able to identify a set of comparatively simple moral beliefs on which the rest 
of our moral knowledge somehow ‘depends’. Either way, a certain amount of pressure is 
put on the idea that justified moral beliefs arrived at from the armchair are immune to 
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debunking explanations informed by moral beliefs that can only be only arrived at from a 
standpoint beyond its reach. For some contemporary philosophers, this possibility may 
provide just enough motivation to leave the sitting room and move into the garden. 
Although I do not propose to argue for this claim here, I believe that doing so does not 
seriously endanger our entitlement to at least some of our substantial moral beliefs (c.f. 
Lillehammer 2010). Just because a certain range of moral claims that were previously 
thought to be empirically intractable are no longer considered to be beyond all reasonable 
doubt from the comfort of the armchair, it does not follow that the same range of claims 
would fail to pass the same test from the comfort of the garden chair. If so, there may be 
room for a moderate position in moral epistemology that is robust enough to withstand 
the more radical challenges of a posteriori debunking without relying on a flat-footed a 
priorism about moral knowledge. 
 
Appendix: one way to read the Open Question Argument 
 
One of the more puzzling aspects of Twentieth Century moral philosophy is how 
Moore’s main argument for ethical non-naturalism could have been so massively 
influential if, as many subsequent critics (including Ross) have pointed out, it is so 
obviously implausible on its own terms. Thus, in the last few decades, the existence of a 
posteriori identities has frequently been cited as one of the two main objections to 
Moore’s so-called ‘open question argument’ for ethical non-naturalism, according to 
which the property of goodness cannot be identified with any natural property (or any 
other property for that matter) because whichever natural (or other) property (e.g. being 
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pleasurable or desired) we attribute to some object, it will always remain an ‘open 
question’ among competent speakers whether that property is good. When considered on 
the purely semantic and metaphysical terms on which it is often proposed, this objection 
may well be decisive. (I take no view on this matter here.) When considered in the light 
of the preceding discussion of Moore’s response to the moral sciences of his time, 
however, this objection is arguably misguided, at least on Moore’s own terms. Suppose 
that what Moore was looking for was not just some property with which ‘good’ is 
necessarily coextensive (or necessarily coextensive and grasped through some particular 
mode of presentation), but a property with which ‘good’ is necessarily coextensive (or 
necessarily coextensive and grasped through some particular mode of presentation), and 
its identification with which can play the psychological role of a basic foundational claim 
in a system of moral knowledge actually possessed by conceptually competent human 
adults. On that assumption, it is much less plausible to claim that any a posteriori identity 
will do, at least if the discovery of that identity depends on a substantial amount of 
empirical theory that is not accessible from the ‘armchair’. On this reading, the a 
posteriori identity objection, at least as it is normally formulated, is at best dubiously on 
target with respect what Moore’s ‘open question argument’ is meant to show.29 
 
Although I do not mean to claim that this reading of ‘the open question argument’ is the 
only plausible (or even the best) way to make sense of everything Moore says in 
                                                
29 Even if we reject Moore’s ‘aprioristic’ epistemology, we could accept his ‘open 
question argument’ as proving that no naturalistic (or other) definition of ‘good’ is 
possible on his own ‘aprioristic’ terms. Our disagreement with Moore would now be one 
about his moral epistemology, and his view about how epistemology relates to semantics 
and ontology.  
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Principia Ethica, I do want to claim that there is some textual and contextual evidence 
that supports it. First, the ‘property’ targeted by the argument is the property of ‘good’, 
which stands at the very foundation of Moore’s ethical system, and therefore (by 
implication) what he thought of as the basic core of our actual moral competence. As 
Moore himself puts it, ‘”good” is the notion upon which all Ethics depends’, where the 
dependence in question is most plausibly read as obtaining in the order of knowledge, and 
not necessarily in the order of being (Moore 1903, 142).30 Second, and as Thomas 
Baldwin has pointed out, Moore and his contemporaries were notoriously slippery in 
their use of terms such as ‘notion’, ‘idea’, ‘concept’, ‘property’, ‘predicate’ and ‘object’; 
frequently sliding across the ‘sense/reference distinction’ (Baldwin 2004). The claim that 
the ‘property’ the term ‘good’ refers to is something that can form a part of a relation in 
extension in the way required for a purely metaphysical (as opposed to a conceptual) 
identity cannot, therefore be taken for granted on Moore’s own terms. Another possibility 
is that Moore is primarily looking for an a priori conceptual identity in the realm of 
‘notions’ or ‘ideas’. Third, the philosophy of language practiced by some of Moore’s 
contemporaries had a strongly epistemological element (c.f. Russell’s conception of 
logically proper names (‘this’ and ‘that’) as picking out the sense data of immediate 
experience (Sainsbury 1979)). Partly in light this fact, Baldwin interprets ‘the open 
question argument’ as having a non-eliminable epistemological element, when he writes 
                                                
30 Moore defines the concept of ‘duty’ as follows: ‘Our ‘duty’… can only be defined as 
that action, which will cause more good to exist in the Universe than any possible 
alternative’ (Moore 1903, 148). Notoriously, he claims that ‘universal propositions of 
which duty is a predicate, so far from being self-evident, always require a proof, which it 
is beyond our present means of knowledge ever to give’ (Moore 1903, 181).  In The Right 
and the Good, Ross objects to Moore’s definition, claiming that the question whether 
what is our duty is what will produce the most good is just as open as the question 
whether what is good is what will produce pleasure (Ross 1930). This definition of ‘duty' 
in terms of ‘the good’ is absent from Moore’s later treatment of the topic (c.f. Moore 
1912)) 
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that ‘Moore’s argument for the indefinability of good is focused on the unacceptable 
epistemological implications of ordinary analytic and theoretical definitions’, because 
‘one primary purpose of a definition of good is… [that it] …should enable us to decide 
on non-ethical grounds what is good’ (Baldwin 2004, 322-3) (Baldwin 2004, 326).31 
According to Baldwin, these epistemological assumptions are sufficient to justify Moore 
rejection of any definition of good in terms of an indefinite disjunction of natural 
properties, although it leaves his argument undefended both against possible definitions 
in terms of an infinite, but well-defined disjunction of natural properties (Baldwin 2004, 
326), and against a posteriori ‘natural kind’ style definitions (Baldwin 2004, 323). On the  
reading of Moore’s argument that I am considering here, the strongly epistemological 
constraints on an acceptable definition would allow him to reject these alternative 
definitions as well, because neither an infinite disjunction (however well-defined) nor an 
a posteriori identity can arguably play the epistemologically foundational role that Moore 
is asking any putative definition of ‘good’ to play. On this reading of the argument, what 
Baldwin’s interpretation leaves out is the role played by the ‘aprioristic’ foundationalism 
that lies at the heart of Moore’s intuitionist project; a view which, although it is 
inextricably connected with Moore’s commitment to ethical non-naturalism, is logically 
distinct from it. 
 
                                                
31 Baldwin also writes that ‘anyone who accepts the definition in the context of the theory 
is committed to holding that the definition provides a new and superior epistemology for 
ethical questions’ (Baldwin 2004, 323), and that ‘a central element in Moore’s thesis of 
the indefinability of good is the epistemological claim that ethical reflection plays an 
inescapable role in moral judgement’ (Baldwin 2004, 324). These claims are both 
consistent with the reading of the ‘open question argument’ offered here, but stop short of 
attributing to Moore the stronger thesis that the definition in question should play the role 
of an a priori self evident foundation for our moral knowledge. 
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A reading of ‘the open question argument’ along the lines just proposed also provides the 
basis for a possible response on Moore’s behalf against the second apparently fatal 
objection often given to that argument, namely that he failed to realize the significance of 
the fact that there are non-obvious a priori truths, and that some naturalistic (or other) 
definition of ‘good’ could be one of those. On my reading of Moore’s argument, this 
objection is not so much wide of the mark as based on a misunderstanding of what Moore 
(righly or wrongly) thought he could establish. One of the salient facts about the 
conceptions of self evidence espoused by the classical intuitionists is that there is no 
necessary connection between a truth being self evident on the one hand, and that truth 
being obvious on the other (c.f. Sidgwick 1907; Ross 1930). What is crucial to the notion 
of self evidence is the idea of a truth that is either incapable of (e.g. Moore) or that stands 
in no need of (e.g. Bentham) proof, and our characteristic mode of access to which is in 
some way ‘direct’ (e.g. by way ‘acquantance’ as opposed to ‘description’, or by being 
present to the mind as a ‘clear and distinct’ idea).32 If Moore were operating with such a 
notion of self-evidence, then the mere fact that a definition of ‘good’ could be correct, be 
a priori knowable, but also non-obvious would present no fundamental difficulty for his 
view. On the present interpretation, Moore’a view is consistent with this fact. What he is 
claiming is that there is no definition of ‘good’ (including a complex a priori network 
analysis (see e.g. Jackson 1998)) that satisfies these criteria, while also being able to play 
the requisite epistemological role. Although Moore could reasonably be accused of 
having made this claim on a flimsy inductive basis, he cannot (on this reading) be 
                                                
32 Tracing the history of assumed connections between self evident truths and knowledge 
by acquantance would take me too far afield here. For further discussion, see e.g. Audi 
2004. 
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accused of simply having missed the possibility that some a priori truths are far from 
obvious. 
 
It has not been my intention in this Appendix to defend Moore’s ‘open question 
argument’, either in this or in any other form. Nor has it been my intention to recommend 
the epistemologically driven philosophy of language on which I suspect it may have been 
based. What I have tried to do is provide a contextually sensitive reading of the open 
question argument according to which it is less obviously implausible on its own terms 
than many contemporary presentations of the argument make it out to be. This reading of 
the argument gains further support from the fact, as illustrated in the main body of this 
paper, that the idea of a priori self evidence plays a central part elsewhere in Moore’s 
moral philosophy, as well as in the moral philosophy of his intuitionist contemporaries. 
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